Article: Nationalism and Legitimation for Authoritarianism: A Comparison of Nicholas I and Vladimir Putin
Unlike any other article I've read, this joint article compares leaders Vladimir Putin [21st century] and Nicholas I [1825-1855] on authoritarian, nationalist, and policy grounds. By astutely relating the actions of these conservative rulers, Russia's long-term commitment to "state-controlled nationalism" and "authoritarian politics" can be better understood.
In short, Putin isn't simply a Soviet apologist. His political philosophy is shaped by the failures of the Soviet Union, the success of the Tsarist regime, and the understanding that the facilities available in the contemporary decade can realize what past rulers only attempted. During Nicholas's era, he used the policy of "Official Nationalism" [Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationalism] to convince the Russian народ of absolutist rule's necessity and a verticalized power structure. However, Putin exploited the influx of Western culture, and has used exceptionalism to its full potential, supported by a mythos of post-Soviet saviorism tied to his identity in 2000. Putin was the hero that would save Russia and restore the empire.
Apparently, comparisons such as these are common [Ivan IV and Stalin, Putin and Andropov], however Putin's sympathies for the fall of the Soviet Union are not restorative in focus, but instead embodies an archetypal Russian paradox...
“He who does not regret the break-up of the Soviet Union has no heart; he who wants to revive it in its previous form has no head”
The argument is that both rulers tried to maximize nationalism's political influence, thereby using it not as a force of mass galvanization towards crafting a Russian identity, but instead a tool to solidify their regimes. By exploiting the ideology of cultural superiority and tying it to power, if the regime was not in power Russia would fall into depravity. Referencing Gerschenkron (1962) and his notion of a "backwards state," those countries which have lagged in sociocultural development, must play catch-up with the "advanced states," usually looking like unscrupulous innovation, holding a higher risk of centralization.
Nicholas Ist and Nationalism
The French Revolution of 1786 and its role in inspiring the first wave of popular sovereignty cannot be understated, and it was certainly not lost of Nicholas. The themes of self-governance, civil representation, and populist leadership were becoming incredibly formative for Russia in the first half of the 19th century. Following the Napoleonic War of 1812, various streams of activity had begun to realize the latent power of the Russian narod.
In the liminality between Nicholas's appointment and Alexander II's death, a revolution called "The Decembrist Revolt" had broken out between the troops dedicated to brother Constantine ["rebels"] and those dedicated to Nicholas ["loyalists"], causing a riff in public opinion as to who was truly fit to rule over Russia and decide its future. But it ran deeper, as they embodied the "Spirit of the Age," a mass push for liberal government and more people-focused leadership, tying the European oppositional movements to Russia and defining an unintentional first blush with what would become Leninism. But the failure of any organization doomed it to fail, and once Nicholas ascended power his disgust for these foreign "monsters" helped enforce that the true Russian "narod" [the people] valued monarchial rule, and wanted to live under a Tsar.
In 1825, he published his first Manifesto which outlined why Tsardom and his rulership was a vital part of the Russian cultural identity. He used a theological argument to justify his appointment, and portrayed the people as desirous for it. Thus, despite having meritorious roots the push for popular sovereignty was instead reformed to be the prevailing excuse for absolutism. If the people want it, then I will deliver. In 1833, Minister of the Department of Education Sergei Uvarov created the most influential piece of ideological doctrine in Russia, he policy of "Official Nationalism," a heavily-bent cousin of liberte egalite fraternite. But presiding over this pseudo-universal ideology was the notion that to be truly Russian, one must be humble [smirenie], and subordinate to authority, Tsardom, and those in power. In this way, the third tenant 3) narodnost [nationalism] was the pitiful excuse to appease the Decembrist veins in Russia. However, it's life was in cultural circles, and not political ones.
Around this time the birth of the Slavophile [pro-Russia] vs. Westerner [pro-Europe] debate was beginning to become a sociopolitical talking point [see The Circle of Stankevich], having been born from cultural debates from within Moscow State University in the 1830s. The main element of this contention was whether Russia should look towards its own cultural heritage as its guiding light or if Western Europe was Russia's ticket to national development. What's fascinating is that Nicholas couldn't strategically rally behind Slavophilic principles because if he did, that would embolden the Russian people to overthrow the very political regime he was attempting to maintain. Nationalism under Nicholas I was about cunning slight-of-hands and civic obfuscations, a brash attempt to cement statist nationalism inside Russia without having to buy into real nationalism at all.
Putin and Nationalism
Putin's ascent to power is another topic entirely, having emerged from relative obscurity, taking over as Boris Yeltsin's popularity dwindled, and unhappiness/insecurity around the future of Russia was entering Y2K. After having given a riotous speech in 1999 talking about the future of Russia under his leadership, Putin began his first term as President of Russia 2000 as the restorationist Father of the Russian people. Having enough sense to merge his own conservative Soviet beliefs into the popular, democratic-constitutional framework, Putin appealed to the Russian people's desire for representation and populist governance unlike any leader before him. The article points to Putin's charismatic and paternal nature as one of the reasons why he amassed so much power in such a short amount of time, however highlighting the more nefarious elements as well [heavy-handed coercion, mass corruption].
Thus, under Putin's leadership Nationalism and Russianness began taking a radically exclusionary angle, identical perhaps to pre-Soviet nationalist ideologies of blood-relations, where real Russianness was defined as those of like genetics and similar heritages. In the 2000s, prior to Medvedev's appoint in 2009, the early post-Soviet landscape was full of xenophobia, palpably anti-Western attitudes (only growing in strength as the less utopian realization of Western culture began emerging), and battle-lines being drawn being civic vs. ethnic Russianness (liberal inclusion vs. conservative exclusion). All of these themes are still present in Russia today, and are certainly not going anywhere soon.
The article stresses three points that are pivotal to Putin's authoritarian control of the nationalist debate, and what should be and should not be considered the Russian identity, those being "“Patriotism, Power, Statism," almost entirely analogous to the troika of Nicholas Ist's policy of Official Nationalism, while also a dogmatic variant of the French tripartite form.
1) Patriotism: Meaning love of country, its achievements, and historical development, it has come to be resemble Putin's tool towards shaping Russia into a "guided democracy." The people obviously couldn't create a country nor restore Russia's imperial legacy by themselves, and when they tried they sank the country into a 70+ year hole. By restoring Soviet and Tsarist elements (national anthem, flag, ritual pageantry), the people could come to learn and love Russia once again. However, this is a relationship built by respect for authority, minimized difference, and a ripe helping of obtuse, Russian exceptionalism.
2) Power: Putin stresses through without militaristic and political recognition of the global stage, Russia cannot truly restore the legacy of their Imperial heritage. They must be respected as a nation-state capable of backing their bark. The mythos surrounding Putin had come as Russia was crippled with economic destabilization, political uncertainty, and shrinking borders. It is up to Putin to restore the country's valourization in the eyes of the world, thereby restoring Russia's prestige. Without influence, national pride is unimaginable.
3) Statism: Possibly Putin's "leit-motif," this underscores everything, and stabilizes/justifies all other actions being taken to color Russia a nation-state capable of global superiority. Such goals are represented through her vague constitution in order to keep the public healthy and easy amenability to ensure absolutist longevity, and hoards of absurd laws targeting Westernism, free expression, political opposition, moral cleanliness, and atraditionality of all kinds. Maintaining "internal stability" has always been the vital baseline.
The article finishes with delineating what Putin's democratic Russia looks like when compared to Nicholas Ist by ascribing several key points which underscore and undermine the "backwards" character of Russia, then in the 19th century and now in the 21st century.
1) Like Nicholas Ist, Putin avoids direct endorsement of nationalism, popular sovereignty, and indications that those beliefs are supported or encouraged by the Russian government.
2) Like Nicholas, although delineating his dedication to improving Russia and furthering its development, little is done to fully effectuate his words, causing an unanswerable paradox.
3) Putin's governmental leadership, like Nicholas Ist, is constantly battling with two streams of democratic sympathies in Russia, representational democracy and guided democracy.
4) Putin recognizes the need to adopt the West's "best practices" in Russia, but has taken an infantile and quasi-serfic road instead, painting the Russian people as in need of daddy.
They finish with a quote that is just as damning as it is truthful, and speaks to the failures of Putin's government to help Russia realize its potential as a nation-state comprised of high culture and sophisticated outlooks. Because of the "advantage of backwardness," policies of exploited nationalism and leavened patriotism have left Russia vulnerable to degradation.
"The Russian state has been able to distract its citizens from the undemocratic nature of Russian society by equating Russianness with love, respect, and the need for authority”
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